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Article 
Can Military Intervention Create Peace? 
The Dilemma between a Quick Halt to Violence and State-building in 
Libya and Tunisia 
NAKATSUKA Tomoyukii 
This paper sheds light on the negative relationship between military intervention leading to re-
gime change and the state-building process. The civil war in Libya was ended quickly by armed 
intervention. However, the process poses many serious obstacles to democracy and a stable socie-
ty. On the other hand, Tunisia experienced regime change by peaceful means, which resulted in 
the favorable state-building process relative to Libya. Thus, the author argues that military inter-
vention leading to regime change can have a negative impact on post-intervention society. This 
finding also gives us an instrumental insight regarding the civil war in Syria, which is currently 
ongoing. 
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1 Introduction 
It has been five years since the Arab Spring began in Tunisia that experienced a relatively peaceful regime 
change. However, in the Syrian war, unlike in Libya, the international community has focused on trying to settle 
the conflict through mediation and negotiation as opposed to armed intervention. Consequently, the conflict is 
the longest lasting and most intractable turmoil of the Middle Eastern uprising. Should the international society 
intervene in Syria, as well as in Libya? 
In this paper, the argument serves to shed light on the negative relationship between military intervention lead-
ing to regime change and state-building after a change of government by analyzing the cases of Libya and Tuni-
sia. As a result of the military intervention, the violence in Libya was quickly halted. However, the democratiza-
tion or the state-building process in Libya seems to have a large number of obstacles in comparison with the 
process in Tunisia. The biggest difference in the situation in Libya from that of Tunisia is that although the for-
mer experienced armed intervention resulting in regime change, the latter underwent regime change by peaceful 
means. The aim of this paper is to answer the following question: Whereas armed intervention bringing about 
regime change can stop violence quickly, is it also likely to affect the state-building process negatively? 
To examine the question, the second section examines the theories of armed intervention and its consequences 
on post-intervention society. The third section describes the rationales for choosing the cases of Libya and Tuni-
sia, and the criteria for the comparison of state-building. The fourth section compares and analyzes the two case 
study examples. Finally, I present a policy implication in regard to armed intervention that leads to regime 
change, keeping the affairs in Syria in mind because there is the possibility of military intervention by the inter-
national community to end the war between the Assad regime and opposition groups. 
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2 Theory 
Much has been written on the relationship between armed intervention and the potential consequences such 
action may have on society. Some scholars argue that military intervention has a positive impact on target states 
following armed intervention (Hermann and Kegley 1998; Meernik 1996; Peceny 1999; Tures 2005). Tures 
(2005), for example, argues that the U.S. military interventions, to some extent, fostered democratization in tar-
get governments during the Cold War. Specifically, Peceny (1999) argues that the U.S. military intervention 
supporting free and fair elections is likely to promote democratization of target countries.  
In contrast, others are pessimistic about a relationship between military intervention and its outcome (Bueno 
de Mesquita and Downs 2006; Downes and Monten 2013; Pearson, Walker and Stern 2006; Walker and Pearson 
2007). Downs and Monten (2013, 94, 130), for instance, allege that overthrowing foreign regimes per se does 
not result in enhancing democracy because it does not address domestic obstacles to democratization, such as 
economic underdevelopment, ethnic heterogeneity or lack of prior experience of democracy. Bueno de Mesquita 
and Downs (2006, 647) insist that interventions aiming at democratization are unlikely to lead to democratiza-
tion because ‘democratic leaders are constitutionally charged with being agents of their domestic constituencies 
and their voters’ policy priorities are rarely identical with those of citizens in the target state’. Put differently, it 
is obvious that citizens of the target state cannot elect a leader in an intervening state. Consequently, intervention 
can result in erosion of democracy.  
Thirdly, there are some conditional arguments regarding armed intervention and democracy (Gleditsch, Silje-
holm, and Hegre 2007; Pickering and Peceny 2006; Williams and Masters 2011). Pickering and Peceny (2006, 
555-56) argue that military intervention with UN support in post-intervention phase has a positive effect on de-
mocratization. Gleditsch, Siljeholm, and Hegre (2007, 40) also conclude that democratic intervention promotes 
democratization only in the short run.  
More recently, an increasing number of scholars have begun to examine the intervention in Libya and the 
post-intervention society in general. More specifically, some have discussed the “Responsibility to Protect” 
(R2P) in Libya (Bellamy 2011; Weiss 2011), the legitimacy and legality of Western-influenced regime change in 
Libya (Payandeh 2012), and have performed evaluations of a negative impact of humanitarian intervention 
(Howorth 2013). More so, other scholars have examined the transitional process in Libya (Boduszyñski and 
Pickard 2013), and gender and state-building (Langhi 2014). 
From this literature review, it seems little literature exists that examines intervention and its impact on democ-
ratization and/or state-building in the context of the Arab Spring. Thus this paper’s contribution is to fill in that 
gap. Building on previous research that has shown the results of intervention to be debatable, it does not seem 
that military intervention, occasionally or conditionally, is likely to have a positive impact on democratization 
and/or state-building. Additionally, our intuitive understanding that armed intervention can stop violence quickly 
is theoretically supported (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000, 633) and, as has been empirically shown in the 
cases of Libya, intervention sometimes results in an immediate halt to violence and, without intervention, such as 
in the case of Syria, lack of thereof can lead to prolonged conflict between a government and opposition groups. 
I, therefore, present the following theoretical perspective to answer the question, raised in the introduction: 
While armed intervention can stop violence quickly, armed intervention resulting in regime change is likely to 
bring about unfavorable consequences in the state-building process. This potential dilemma of armed interven-
tion shall be empirically discussed in the case studies section in detail. 
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3 Research Design 
In this section, I explain my rationale for choosing the case studies of Libya and Tunisia and clarify my inter-
pretation of the terms ‘state-building’ and ‘armed intervention’ to assist in the comparison and analysis of the 
case studies in light of the theoretical perspective. 
I examine how armed intervention affects state-building after regime change by comparing the case in Libya, 
where the regime was changed by armed intervention, to a case in Tunisia, where there was no armed interven-
tion but the country experienced regime change. Although unlike in Libya, a series of event in Tunisia saw the 
quick transition from the outbreak of the disturbance to the regime change since Tunisia didn’t experience a civil 
war, I believe that this difference does not impact the dilemmas associated with armed intervention. The time 
span examined here is from the collapse of the regimes in Tunisia and Libya, which is from 2011 and 2012 re-
spectively, to June 2015.   
In this analysis, ‘state-building’ is chosen as the dependent variable and consists of the process of establishing 
democracy and some aspects of peace-building. Indicators to measure democratization are obtained from Free-
dom House, Democracy Index, and Worldwide Governance Indicators. Specifically, the paper explores the fol-
lowing indicators in the next section: electoral processes and free and fair elections, functioning of government, 
and political stability. Secondly, the peace-building aspects are measured using the indicators used in the book, 
Contemporary Conflict Resolution, by Ramsbotham, Woohouse, and Miall (2011, 213, 229). Although using 
some of the same indicators as ‘democratization', the peace-building perspectives explore dissolution and dis-
armament of armed groups, the rule of law and human rights, and recovery of law and order. Additionally, the 
Failed State Index, as well as other indexes mentioned above, are also used to compare the two cases.  
‘Armed intervention’ or ‘military intervention’ as the independent variable is defined as ‘the use of troops of 
forces to cross borders or the employment of forces already based in a foreign country in pursuit of political or 
economic objectives in the context of a dispute’ (Pearson, Baumann, and Pickering 1994, 209). This definition 
includes armed intervention conducted by NATO.  
4 Case Studies 
In this section, the state-building process in Libya and Tunisia are illustrated respectively through exploration 
of the indicators outlined in the research design section: 1) electoral processes and free and fair elections; 2) 
functioning of government; 3) political stability; 4) dissolution and disarmament of armed groups; 5) the rule of 
law and human rights; and 6) recovery of law and order. The Libyan and Tunisian cases are compared and ana-
lyzed using the theatrical perspective as a basis for study, suggesting a few limits of the analysis in the case stud-
ies.   
4-1 Libya  
In February 2011, a peaceful demonstration against the regime began in Libya which quickly turned violent, 
resulting in civil wars. In March, the UN Security Council passed a resolution (UNSCR 1973) authorizing 
NATO air strikes to protect civilians. In other words, an armed intervention by the international community was 
launched which eventually led to the end of the conflict in October following Gaddafi’s death.           
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The first free national election in six decades took place in July 2012 and the National Transitional Council 
(NTC), the opposition group during the conflict, handed power to the General National Congress (GNC). The 
GNC then elected Mohammed Magarief as its chairman, the interim head of state and appointed a prime minis-
ter, Ali Zeidan. In February 2014, Libyans protested against the GNC’s refusal to dissolve itself in spite of the 
promise they had made previously. In response to the backlash from the citizenry, the government acquiesced 
and announced upcoming elections to take place on the 25th of June. In the meantime, an election was held to 
determine the make-up of the Constitutional Assembly who were tasked with writing Libya’s new constitution. 
Unsurprisingly, Libyan citizens were not enthusiastic about the constitutional election. This was mainly due to a 
lack of security for voters, existence of antagonistic militias, and distrust of the government. The low voter turn-
out figures indicate that the citizenry had lost trust in the government’s democratic processesii. 
One of the biggest key tasks the new Libyan government had to deal with was the dissolution and disarma-
ment of hundreds of ideologically divided militias. Some were fundamentalist Islamic groups while others held a 
more separatist or liberal ideology and all were separated along religious and ethnic lines. They were, however, 
united under a single goal to overthrow Gaddafi’s government; however, when the regime was overthrown there 
was little left to unify the groupsiii. Consequently, the country suffered from an absence of security and became 
lawless. Nevertheless, positive aspects did arise from the fomentation of the various rebel groups. Whereas the 
Libyan army was still untrained and ineffective in the maintenance of the law and order, the standing militias 
began to take on military and police roles in Libya, providing security and maintaining domestic orderiv.      
During the conflict, the Eastern part of Libya was considered one of the most fragile regions and symbolized 
the division of the country. In particular, Benghazi became the seat of the opposition movement and focal point 
of the 2011 uprising. In 2013, an armed group comprised of current and former employees of border security and 
petroleum guard blockaded important oilfields and ports in the East for a month. This area, despite being rich in 
oil deposits, had been historically neglected and marginalized by Gaddafi, who instead promoted development in 
the West and Tripoliv. This Western focus led to a fundamental dissatisfaction in Libyan society as the central-
ized system did not guarantee equal and fair distribution of wealthvi. In fact, this led the Eastern leadership to 
declare semi-autonomy in 2012. In addition, the Congress ousted Zeidan, accusing him of the government’s 
failure to stop armed groups in the Eastern area from independently exporting oil in March 2014. His govern-
ment had been repeatedly criticized for its failure to disarm militias that have carved out their own fiefdoms after 
the intervention of NATOvii. 
In May 2014, Khalifa Hafter, an opposition leader during the civil war led an abortive coup in the East. This 
had not been his first attempt at a coup d' état-like act and had faced accusation by the government. However, 
this action exposed a weakness of the central authority. While a huge number of militias have been on the rise 
since the civil war, demand from the population for guaranteed security from the government had not been se-
cured. Hafter addressed this need and provided security to the local people. Surprisingly, even Libyan soldiers 
cooperated with Khalifa Hafter to fight against radical Islamist groups, ignoring direct orders to the contrary 
from Tripoli. In addition to the unstable security situation, the abduction of Ali Zaiden in 2013 and the assassina-
tion of the deputy industry minister in 2014 can been seen collectively as indicative of the undermining central 
governmentviii.  
Since the uprising, Libya has suffered from arbitrary detentions, unlawful killings, torture and forced dis-
placement at the hands of the militias who have acted with absolute impunity in the maintenance of security. 
Regional courts in some parts of the country were not under control of the government, and hence judicial func-
tion was shut down. Thereby, the human rights situation is liable to deteriorate, which could lead to a collapsed 
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state unless the international community addresses justice and security system in Libyaix. In fact, the Failed 
States Index Ranking in 2010 -- 1 meaning the most failed state and 177/178 meaning the most stable state -- 
shows that Libya was ranked 111th out of 177 countries. However, its rank in 2013 Index was 54th out of 178 
countriesx.  
4-2 Tunisia 
An anti-government protest erupted in October 2010 and the President, Zine el-Abidinde Ben Ali, was ousted 
after a series of demonstrations. One year after the regime change, the national election took place peacefully. 
The voter turnout reached 70% and the moderate Islamist Ennahda party won the election. As a result, Moncef 
Marzouki was elected president and Hamadi Jebali was appointed as prime ministerxi.  
Almost three years following the uprising in Tunisia, the new country’s constitution was established in 2014. 
It guarantees freedom of belief. Additionally, the Ennahda party removed references to Islamic law in the consti-
tution. The majority of Tunisians, however, have remained unconvinced about the actual effectiveness of the 
new constitution in improving their daily lives. In particular, they are more worried about economic development 
as the unemployment rate, especially among the youth, is still high. The improvement of living standards and the 
recovery of economy remain the main demands of the population. This unstable economic situation has resulted 
in political instability and in some cases, has caused riotingxii.  
Moreover, the assassination of two opposition politicians in 2013 symbolizes an unstable political and security 
situation. These assassinations brought about a stand-off between Ennahda and secular parties. Correspondingly, 
opposition supporters held a demonstration demanding fresh elections. Consequently, the ruling party agreed to 
step down and hand over to a non-partisan caretaker government in Octoberxiii. According to the election agency 
chief in Tunisia, the next presidential and parliamentary elections were to probably take place in November 
2014xiv.   
In regards to security situation particularly in Tunisia, Islamic rebel groups have troubled the central authority 
for a long time. In May 2012, hundreds of Salafi Islamic extremists attacked a police station and clashed with 
security forces due to strife over the selling of alcohol. There was another clash between the Islamists and police 
in May 2013 and at least one person was killed during the fightxv. The main instigators of the violence are a mi-
nority of Salafist groups who insist upon the implementation of an Islamic moral system in the country. One of 
them has been actually accused of assassinations of the two politicians in 2013. It is opined that the rise of ex-
tremist Islamist groups stems from fewer jobs opportunities and a decrease in the standard of living. Despite this, 
Islamic social groups have offered jobs, Islamic schooling and distributed alms to the poor. Furthermore, the 
simple justice system offered by Salafists has attracted people’s attention, which has posed a serious challenge to 
the central authorityxvi. 
Regarding human rights, secular Tunisians, especially women, are concerned with the ultra-conservative Is-
lamists that have been influential to the society since the uprising, because despite holding a margin of tolerance, 
the government puts increased pressure on the state-run media and new constitution to decrease women’s rights. 
As a matter of fact, thousands of people protested against the government policy that tried to curtail women’s 
rights in August 2012
xviii
xvii. The constitution established in this year recognized equality between men and women 
for the first time . 
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5   Comparison and Analysis 
Considering the perspectives of democratization and peace-building, the situation in Libya is more disastrous 
than the one in Tunisia over all. In this section, the two cases are compared by using the indexes shown in the 
research design section.  
To begin with, both Libya and Tunisia have held free elections and are preparing for the next round of elec-
tions to strengthen the democratization process. According to the Democracy Index in 2012, Libya ranks 95th 
and Tunisia ranks 90th out of 167 countriesxix. Although there is not a significant difference between the two 
countries, Libya has experienced serious electoral violence in the last election, which might endanger the state-
building process in the future. 
When it comes to security situation in the two counties, both of the counties have suffered from insecurity 
stemming from rebel groups since before the Arab Spring. There is no denying that the uprising fostered activi-
ties of these rebel groups, but the security situation in Libya is not as stable and safe as that in Tunisia on the 
basis of the fact that a number of militias have been active in the country since the civil war. From 2010 to 2013, 
Libya dropped from 111th to 54th position in the Failed States Index Ranking. In contrast, Tunisia’s ranking 
changed from 118th to 83rd. This index, combined with specific examples of a volatile security situation, indi-
cate that Libya is becoming a collapsed state.    
In relation to security situation, aspects of human rights and the rule of law are not in good conditions in either 
country. According to the survey of Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) through 2011 to 2012, the indica-
tor of the rule of law suggests no significant transition before or after the regime change in the two states. How-
ever, in Libya the rule of law indicator of WGI is basically exceedingly lower than Tunisia’sxx. This means that 
whereas there is huge room for Libya to improve the aspect of the rule of law, a large number of influential and 
substantive rebel groups hindered Libya from establishing a society based on the rule of law. 
From the previous conclusions, it is suggested that Libya’s state-building process has been met with more ob-
stacles relative to Tunisia. It is opined that the military intervention in Libya negatively influenced the society 
because there was no central authority that could control the entire country after the regime change. Consequent-
ly, the intervention impeded the state-building process. Thus the question formulated in the introduction, that is, 
‘whereas armed intervention bringing about regime change can stop violence quickly, is it also likely to affect 
the state-building process negatively?’ is confirmed based on the analysis in this paper.  
Finally, there are some limitations with regard to this analysis. For example, it has been only three years since 
the Arab Spring occurred; hence the time is not ripe enough to evaluate the long-term effect of the intervention 
on Libya. In contrast, as the time passes, many other confounding factors may account for democratization shift 
in post intervention period. Accordingly, establishing the time period is a complicated element in examining the 
consequences of military intervention in target states. Secondly, democracy and the rule of law rates in Libya 
have been somewhat lower by comparison with Tunisia before the Arab Spring. As a consequence, this Libya’s 
lower rates can lead us to a conclusion that Libya’s state-building process is worse than that of Tunisia even after 
the uprising. Still, the two cases can be adequate to show the inherent dilemma of armed intervention. 
6   Conclusion  
Beginning with the question whether the international community should militarily intervene in Syria to end 
the conflict between the government and insurgents, I discussed a dilemma of armed intervention between quick 
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halt to violence and an adverse impact on post-intervention society in the context of the Arab Spring. On the 
basis of the case studies conducted in the paper, the analysis enables us to conclude that armed intervention lead-
ing to regime change can have unfavorable consequences on the state-building process. Thus, I present some 
policy implications, particularly keeping the Syrian affairs in mind. First, the international society should support 
countries after regime change takes place. As mentioned in the theory section, Pickering and Peceny (2006) ar-
gue that military intervention with peacekeeping operations can promote successful democratization. Secondly, 
Hegre at el. (2001) conclude that intermediate regimes are very likely to experience civil war. This again 
strengthens the argument over external support to the post-intervention phase. Downes and Monten (2013, 130) 
conclude: ‘[Democratization] is especially unlikely to work in place where it is most likely to be employed: 
weak states such as Syria with little experience with democracy and significant societal divisions’. Notwithstand-
ing, circumstances in Syria are far from peaceful society and thus, military intervention is one of the hopeful 
solutions to end the violence. Therefore, if the international community carries out military intervention, they 
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